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one or more payments under the contract have not been
made, and (b) the consumer has not exercised the right to
unwind in respect of the contract.”
The (amended) CPUTR 2008 also provide a, fairly crude,
sliding scale of the quantum of discounts.28 In terms of
damages, which is of course an established remedy for mis-
representation in England and Wales,29 significantly a con-
sumer is given the right to claim damages for “alarm, distress
or physical inconvenience or discomfort” subject to a remote-
ness test.30 Unlike the other remedies, there is a due diligence
defence (s27J(5)(b): “the trader took all reasonable precau-
tions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the occurrence
of the prohibited practice”).
VI. Concluding Remarks
As a result of the CPAR 2014 the UK now has specific private
law remedies for some unfair commercial practices. Yet these
remedies, which largely operate alongside remedies under the
general law, have added complexity to this area of consumer
law, not least as a result of the legislative drafting. Indeed,
with concerns about fragmentation in mind, there is an argu-
ment that these reforms should have been absorbed into the
Consumer Rights Act 2015. Moreover there are significant
continuing issues around the ability and willingness of con-
sumers to make full use of such remedies31 as well as issues
of consumer education; and it is ultimately those issues which
may dull the potency of these reforms. &
28 Regulation 27I (4): “Subject to paragraph (6), the relevant percentage is
as follows: (a) if the prohibited practice is more than minor, it is 25%,
(b) if the prohibited practice is significant, it is 50%, (c) if the prohibited
practice is serious, it is 75%, and (d) if the prohibited practice is very
serious, it is 100%.”. Regulation 27I(6) concerns products where the
contract price exceeds £5,000.
29 There is some authority that damages (or a similar remedy) may be
awarded for undue influence and/or duress: see Mahoney v Purnell
[1996] 3 All E.R. 61 and Law Commission, Consumer Redress for
Misleading and Aggressive Practices (Cm 8328 (2012)) 3.57.
30 Regulation 27J (1): “Subject as follows, a consumer has the right to
damages if the consumer: (a) has incurred financial loss which the
consumer would not have incurred if the prohibited practice in question
had not taken place, or (b) has suffered alarm, distress or physical
inconvenience or discomfort which the consumer would not have suf-
fered if the prohibited practice in question had not taken place. (2) The
right to damages is the right to be paid damages by the trader for the
loss or the alarm, distress or physical inconvenience or discomfort in
question. (3) The right to be paid damages for financial loss does not
include the right to be paid damages in respect of the difference between
the market price of a product and the amount payable for it under a
contract. (4) The right to be paid damages under this regulation is a
right to be paid only damages in respect of loss that was reasonably
foreseeable at the time of the prohibited practice”.
31 See H.G. Beale, ‘Legislative Control of Fairness: The Directive on Unfair
Terms in Consumer Contracts’ in J Beatson & D Friedmann (eds),Good
Faith and Fault in Contract Law, (1995, Clarendon, Oxford).
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UCP-Directive and Swiss Law against Unfair Competition
The UCP-Directive 2005/29/EC and Swiss law against unfair
competition differ in many respects. They are each charac-
terised by different purposes, scopes of application and di-
verging concepts of unfairness and ways of enforcement.
Even in cases in which similar EU-norms directly inspired
special rules in the Swiss UCA such as the rules on unfair
contract terms, consumer credit advertising, spamming, pyr-
amid promotional schemes and transparency in e-commerce,
they differ in detail and they are applied differently. In the
end, Swiss law against unfair competition maintains its char-
acteristics and adopts EU-law in an isolated manner only.
I. Introduction
Switzerland is neither an EU- nor an EEA-Member State.1
The country officially asked for EU-membership in 1992,2
but this request – although never formally repealed – is dead
letter, as the referendum of 2001 turned out negative.3
Nevertheless, the law of the European Union has an impact
on Swiss law. Before covering this topic with respect to the
law against unfair competition (III.), this article highlights the
main differences between the UCP-Directive 2005/29/EC and
the Swiss Act against Unfair Competition (UCA) in a first
part (II.).
II. Divergences between the UCP-Directive and Swiss
Law
1. Different purposes
Besides contributing to the proper functioning of the internal
market,4 the UCP-Directive aims at achieving a high level of
consumer protection.5 It does so by approximating the laws,
regulations and provisions of the Member States on unfair
commercial practices harming consumers’ economic interests
(Art 1 Directive 2005/29/EC). By contrast, the purpose of the
Swiss UCA is much broader: It seeks to ensure fair and
undistorted competition in the interest of all concerned (Art 1
UCA). According to this purpose article, the Swiss UCA has
primarily one objective target, which is to protect competi-
tion as such against unfair practices and distortions6 in any
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revised version of a presentation held at the 2nd Ferrara Forum on
European Consumer and Contract Law on 9th October 2015; the
author would like to thank Aileen Kreyden for the linguistic review of
the article.
1 Switzerland was signatory party of the EEA Agreement but was unable
to ratify it after the negative result of the referendum on 6 December
1992; see Botschaft des Bundesrats über das Folgeprogramm nach der
Ablehnung des EWR-Abkommens vom 24.2.1993, BBl 1993 I, 805 et
seq.
2 See for the motifs of this request dated 20 May 1992 ‘Bericht über einen
Beitritt der Schweiz zur Europäischen Gemeinschaft‘, BBl 1992 III, 1185
et seq.
3 76.8% of the Swiss population voted against the immediate commence-
ment of accession negotiations on 4 March 2001.
4 The objective of market integration is explained in recitals 2 et seq; the
full harmonisation approach of the UCP-Directive does not preclude the
Member States from addressing legal requirements related to taste and
decency (recital 7 Directive 2005/29/EC) or from specifying in national
law the main characteristics of particular products (recital 14 Directive
2005/29/EC).
5 The objective of consumer protection is explained in recitals 6 et seq
Directive 2005/29/EC.
6 See in depth Peter Jung, in: Peter Jung and Philippe Spitz (eds), Bundes-
gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG) – Kommentar (Stämpf-
li 2010) Art 1 paras 2 et seq.
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interest of all stakeholders7 and not to protect the specific
economic interests of consumers only. It safeguards the inter-
ests of consumers as well as competitors and of demanders
other than consumers while also protecting the public inter-
est. Additionally, the UCA covers non-economic interests
such as the protection of the personal sphere if a behaviour
with a relevant impact on competition threatens them.8
2. Different scopes of application
The different extents of the purposes lead to different scopes
of application: Whereas the UCP-Directive applies exclusively
to business-to-consumer commercial practices during and
after a commercial transaction in relation to a product, the
Swiss UCA applies to any behaviour which could potentially
affect the relationship between competitors or between sup-
pliers and demanders.9 That is why the Swiss UCA applies to
any person such as competing suppliers on an offer market,
competing demanders on a demand market and third parties
such as the media,10 test organisations11 or scientists,12
Furthermore, contrary to EU-law (Art 3 (1) Directive 2005/
29/EC), Swiss law does not require a direct link to a commer-
cial transaction in relation to a product in order for it to be
applicable. Thus, there is no doubt that, for example, beha-
viour on demand markets13 or marketing strategies that draw
attention to a supplier in general and not to special pro-
ducts,14 fall within the scope of the UCA, too.
Even though the UCP-Directive indirectly protects the eco-
nomic interests of legitimate competitors15 as well and gives
them standing,16 it neither covers nor affects national laws
on unfair commercial practices which harm competitors’ eco-
nomic interests only or which relate to a transaction between
traders.17 Therefore, in contrast to the Swiss UCA (Art 3 (1)
let a, let e, Art 4, Art 4 a), it does not contain provisions
concerning impediments to competitors.
Despite the objective target of the Swiss UCA and the general
scope of application, one can on the other hand observe an
inconsistent trend towards the protection of individual con-
sumer interests by competition law over the last years. The
most important example is the special rule in Art 8 UCA.18
This rule provides for an unlimited content control of general
contract terms by competition law but is restricted to consu-
mer contracts only.19 Although the UCA does not explicitly
state what happens if the standard terms do violate Art 8
UCA, the prevailing opinion argues that the appropriate con-
sequence is partial invalidity of the respective terms.20 The
invalidity results from Art 20 (1) of the Swiss Code of Ob-
ligations, which states that if a contract is against the law, it
is void. This legal consequence is in fact atypical for unfair
competition law, which does not normally deal with the
question of the validity of a contract concluded in violation
of the UCA.21 In contrast, the UCP-Directive is without pre-
judice to contract law and, in particular, to the rules on the
validity, formation or effect of a contract (Art. 3 (2) Directive
2005/29/EC).
3. Different concepts of unfairness
As far as the prohibited behaviours are concerned, the UCP-
Directive is quite close to the traditional unfairness approach,
which characterises for example the Paris Convention22 and
the ICC-Code.23 The UCP_Directive defines unfair behaviour
as any behaviour that is contrary to the requirements of
professional diligence. These respective standards are set out
in Art 2 let h, which requires a trader to behave in accor-
dance with honest market practice and/or the principle of
good faith in the trader’s field of activity. In contrast, the
Swiss UCA is characterised by a combination of the classical
unfairness approach on the one hand and the so-called func-
tional approach protecting the mechanisms of an undistorted
competition on the other hand (Art. 1 UCA).24 Parting from
this dualistic approach, Swiss doctrine has tried to group the
recognised cases of unfair competition in four main cate-
gories (misleading and aggressive practices, impediments to
competitors, parasitism and advantage due to breach of the
law).25 This method, however, remains much more contested
as for example in German law.26
Like the UCP-Directive (Art 5 Directive 2005/29/EC), Swiss
law contains a general clause of unfair competition (Art 2
UCA). However, Swiss courts are very reluctant to apply this
provision, which in turn means that there are only few cases
7 See in depth Reto M. Hilty, in: Reto M. Hilty and Reto Arpagaus (eds),
Basler Kommentar UWG (Helbing Lichtenhahn 2013) Art 1 paras 89 et
seq.
8 Peter Jung (n 6 above) Einleitung para 18.
9 BGE 82 II 544, 548 (“Schmähschriften”); BGE 117 IV 193, 197 f.
(“Bernina”); BGE 120 II 78 (“Mikrowellenherd I”); in depth Peter Jung
(n 6 above) Art 2 paras 10 et seq.
10 BGE 117 IV 193 (“Bernina”).
11 Andreas Gersbach, Der Produkttest im schweizerischen Recht
(Schulthess 2003), 131 et seq.
12 BGE 120 II 76, 79 (“Mikrowellenherd I”).
13 See for an example of an abuse of a dominant position in a demand
market Carl Baudenbacher, Lauterkeitsrecht – Kommentar zum Gesetz
gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG), (Helbing Lichtenhahn 2001)
Art 2 paras 152 et seq.
14 OGer SH sic! 2012, 409, 410 (“Fresh alpine milk”); Peter Jung (supra
note 6) Art 2 para 10.
15 Recitals 6 and 8 Directive 2005/29/EC.
16 According to Art 11 para 1 subpara 2 Directive 2005/29/EC Member
States shall provide for legal provisions under which also competitors
may take legal action against unfair commercial practices and/or bring
unfair commercial practices before an administrative authority compe-
tent either to decide on complaints or to initiate appropriate legal
proceedings in order to protect effectively the interests of consumers.
17 Recital 6 Directive 2005/29/EC.
18 See in depth Daphne Frei and Peter Jung, ‘Revised Control of Unfair
Terms in Swiss Law – Consumer Protection by Competition Law?’
(2015) EuCML 165 et seq; Esther Widmer, Missbräuchliche Geschäfts-
bedingungen nach Art 8 UWG (Dike 2014); Alexander Brunner/Anton
K. Schnyder/Andrea Eisner-Kiefer (eds), Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingun-
gen nach neuem Schweizer Recht (Schulthess 2013); Jörg Schmid, ‘Die
Inhaltskontrolle Allgemeiner Geschäftsbedingungen: Überlegungen zum
neuen Art 8 UWG‘ (2012) ZBJV 1 et seq; Markus Hess and Lea Ruck-
stuhl, ‘AGB-Kontrolle nach dem neuen Art 8 UWG – eine kritische
Auslegeordnung‘ (2012) AJP 1188 et seq.
19 With a critical approach in depth Peter Jung, ‘Die systematische Stellung
der offenen AGB-Inhaltskontrolle im UWG – Vertrags- und wettbe-
werbsrechtliche Folgeprobleme’, in: Alexander Brunner, Anton K.
Schnyder and Andrea Eisner-Kiefer (eds), Allgemeine Geschäftsbedin-
gungen nach neuem Schweizer Recht (Schulthess 2013) 129 et seq.
20 Botschaft zur Änderung des Bundesgesetzes gegen den unlauteren Wett-
bewerb (UWG) vom 2. September 2009, BBl 2009, 6152 and 6179; Jörg
Schmid (n 18 above) 16 and Ingeborg Schwenzer, Schweizerisches Obli-
gationenrecht – Allgemeiner Teil (6th edn, Stämpfli 2012) para 46.05;
concerning Directive 93/13/EEC: ECJ at 26.6.2000, ECLI:EU:
C:2000:346, Case C-240/98 to C-244/98 (Océano), para 30.
21 Peter Jung (n 19 above) 160.
22 Art 10bis (2) Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
of March 20, 1883: “Any act of competition contrary to honest prac-
tices in industrial or commercial matters constitutes an act of unfair
competition”.
23 Art 1 (1) Consolidated ICC Code Advertising and Marketing Commu-
nication Practice (download under ˂http://www.iccwbo.org˃): “All
marketing communications should be legal, decent, honest and truth-
ful”.
24 Botschaft zu einem Bundesgesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb
(UWG) vom 18. Mai 1983, BBl 1983, 1009, 1038 et seq and 1043
(“Der Rechtsbegriff ‚Treu und Glauben‘ erfasst also sowohl Verletzun-
gen der Geschäftsmoral als auch solche von Funktionsregeln des Wett-
bewerbs…”); see in depth Peter Jung (n 6 above) Art 1 paras 10 et seq.
25 See in depth Peter Jung (n 6 above) Art 2 paras 33 et seq.
26 See mainly the critique of Reto M. Hilty (n 7 above) Art 2 paras 60 et
seq.
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in which the Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgericht, Tribunal
fédéral, Tribunale federale) based its judgment on the general
clause.27 The reason for the scarce use of the general clause
lies in the barring effect that special rules have: It is often
argued that the general rule does not apply to a case because
a special rule is generally applicable, barring any resort to the
general clause. However, while it is true that the case may fall
within the scope of a special rule, more often than not, the
specific prerequisites of that special rule are in fact not met.28
That is one of the main reasons why the Swiss legislator
considerably extended the list of special rules against unfair
competition in Art 3 UCA in 1994,29 200730 and 2012.31 In
2012 for example, it added a special rule according to which
the inobservance of a remark in the telephone book that a
client does not want to be contacted or his data being for-
warded for marketing purposes is considered to be unfair
(opt-out model). Mainly due to its narrow wording32 and
interpretation33 this rule remained generally ineffective.34
Yet, instead of trusting in the additional application of the
general clause in case of non-applicability of the special rule
by the courts, members of the Swiss parliament have started
to discuss an amendment of the special rule in order to
protect the users of mobile phones.35 In doing so, the legisla-
tor gives the courts even more scope to apply special rules
instead of the general clause. Thus, the court’s as well as the
legislator’s behaviours regarding the general clause mutually
reinforce the non-application of it.
The existing special rules of the UCA prohibit for example
unnecessary injurious statements (Art 3 (1) let a UCA), mis-
leading statements (Art 3 (1) let b, let c UCA), measures
causing confusion with the products or services of others (Art
3 (1) let d UCA), bait-and-switch offers (Art 3 (1) let f UCA),
particularly aggressive sales methods (Art 3 (1) let h UCA),
spamming (Art 3 (1) let o UCA), non-transparent offers (Art
3 (1) let p, let s UCA), fictitious invoices (Art 3 (1) let q
UCA), pyramid promotional schemes (Art 3 (1) let r UCA),
unfair sweepstakes (Art 3 (1) let t UCA), inducements to a
breach of contract with third parties (Art 4 UCA), bribery
(Art 4 a UCA), exploitation of someone else’s achievements
(Art 5 UCA), violation of business secrets (Art 6 UCA), non-
compliance with working conditions (Art 7 UCA) and the
use of unfair contract terms in consumer contracts (Art 8
UCA). Even though the respective norms are quite specific in
order to serve mostly also as criminal offences, they do not
compare to the concreteness of the «black list» of unfair
commercial practices as set out in Annex I of Directive 2005/
29/EC.
4. Different ways of enforcement
Whereas the UCP-Directive only broadly regulates the effec-
tive enforcement of competition law by the Member States
(Art 11, 12, 13 Directive 2005/29/EC) the Swiss UCA pro-
vides for a large range of possible enforcement tools in pri-
vate (Art 9 et seq UCA), administrative (Art 20 UCA) as well
as in criminal law (Art 23 et seq combined with Art 3 to
Art 6 UCA). Due to the fact that most of the special rules
against unfair competition may entail criminal sanctions,
criminal proceedings play an increasingly important role for
the enforcement of competition law.36 As far as the private
sanctions are concerned, it should be stressed that, in Swiss
law, not only competitors (Art 9 UCA) and consumers (Art
10 (1) UCA) as well as business associations (Art 10 (2) let a
UCA) and consumer organizations (Art 10 (2) let b UCA) can
sue, but also the Swiss Government may bring private action
for an injunction before the courts. According to Art 10 (3)
UCA this is possible, if the Swiss Government considers the
action necessary in order to protect public interest, namely if
the reputation of Switzerland abroad is threatened or in-
fringed and those affected in their economic interests reside
abroad or if the interests of several people or groups of
members of a sector or other collective interests are threa-
tened or infringed.37 Regardless of the applicable conflict of
laws rules, the public claim is mandatorily treated according
to Swiss competition law as lois d’application immédiate (Art
10 (5) UCA).38 If in the public interest, the Government may
also inform the public about any unfair competition practices
by naming the respective doers (Art 10 (4) UCA).39
III. Impacts of EU-Law on Swiss Law against Unfair
Competition
1. Autonomous enactment of EU-Law
The influence of EU-law and especially the UCP-Directive on
Swiss law against unfair competition follows the general
mechanisms40 by means of which EU-law has an impact on
Swiss law. The most important mechanism takes place on the
legislative level and is called “autonomous enactment” of
EU-rules in Swiss law (autonomer Nachvollzug, reprise
autonome).41 If possible and reasonable, Swiss law tries to be
in line with EU-law. It does so because this facilitates access
to regulated markets and because it allows Swiss enterprises
27 See mainly BGer sic! 1999, 156 (“Kamov”) and BGE 102 II 292, 294 et
seq (“Bico-flex/Lattoflex”); see also BGE 104 II 322, 333 et seq (in casu
answered in the negative).
28 So for example for the precisely formulated special rules Lucas David
and Reto Jacobs, Schweizerisches Wettbewerbsrecht (5th edn Stämpfli
2012), N 54.
29 Adaption of the Swiss UCA (now Art 3 (1) let k–m, 4 let d UCA) to
Directives 87/102/ECC and 84/450/ECC by Bundesgesetz vom 18. Juni
1993 über die Änderung des UWG (AS 1994, 376).
30 Adding of Art 3 let o (now Art 3 (1) let o) and Art 45 a Telecommunica-
tions Act against Spamming by Bundesgesetz vom 24. März 2006 über
die Änderung des Fernmeldegesetzes (AS 2007, 921).
31 Adding of Art 3 (1) let p and let q (register scams), Art 3 (1) let r
(pyramid promotional schemes), Art 3 (1) let s (e-commerce), sweep-
stakes (Art 3 (1) let t) Art 3 (1) let u (cold calling) by Bundesgesetz vom
17. Juni 2011 zur Änderung des UWG (AS 2011, 4909).
32 The special rule only protects telephone connections that are registered
in an official list (“telephone book”) and therefore in practice does not
protect against cold calling on mobile phones.
33 It is for example discussed if the rule applies to electronic or private
blocking lists (see Gregor Bühler, in: Reto M. Hilty and Reto Arpagaus
(eds), Basler Kommentar UWG (Helbing Lichtenhahn 2013) Art 3 (1)
let u para 8).
34 Nevertheless, the Swiss Government issued 17 cease-and-desist-warn-
ings, filed 41 criminal charges and sanctioned 17 enterprises by autumn
2015.
35 Motion 15.3598 of Ständerätin Anita Fetz “Stopp dem Telefonterror.
Allgemeines Verbot von Werbeanrufen auf Mobiltelefone”.
36 Mario M. Pedrazzini and Federico Pedrazzini, Unlauterer Wettbewerb,
UWG (2nd edn, Stämpfli 2002) para 26.30; Peter Jung, ‘Tendenzen im
Recht gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb’, in: Rita Trigo Trindade,
Henry Peter and Christian Bovet (eds), Economie Environnement Ethi-
que, Liber Amicorum Anne Petitpierre-Sauvain (Schulthess 2009) 204 et
seq.
37 Guido Sutter and Florian Lörtscher, ‘Klagerecht des Bundes gegen miss-
bräuchliche AGB’ [2012] recht, 93 et seq.
38 David Rüetschi, in: Reto M. Hilty and Reto Arpagaus (eds), Basler
Kommentar UWG (Helbing Lichtenhahn 2013) Art 10 paras 39 et seq.
39 David Rüetschi (n 38 above) Art 10 paras 46 et seq.
40 See for these mechanisms Peter Jung, ‘Das Argument der Europakompa-
tibilität im schweizerischen Privatrecht’ (2010) ZSR 513, 525 et seq.
41 Carl Baudenbacher, ‘Zum Nachvollzug europäischen Rechts in der
Schweiz’ (1992) EuR 309 et seq.; Lukas Siegenthaler, Die Einführung
europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts in das schweizerische Recht (Helbing
Lichtenhahn 1996); Bruno Spinner and Daniel Maritz, ‘EG-Kompatibi-
lität des schweizerischen Wirtschaftsrechts – Vom autonomen zum sys-
tematischen Nachvollzug’, in: Peter Forstmoser et al. (eds), Der Einfluss
des europäischen Rechts auf die Schweiz, Festschrift für Roger Zäch
zum 60. Geburtstag (Schulthess 1999) 127 et seq.
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to apply the same rules and behave commercially in the same
way in Switzerland as in the European Economic Area.42
In the field of competition law there are several examples of
an anticipation or transposition of EU-Directives to Swiss
law by the free will of the Swiss legislator. Already during the
legislative process leading to the present UCA in the first half
of the nineteen-eighties, the Commission-proposal for the
Council Directive concerning misleading and unfair advertis-
ing of 197843 was taken into consideration.44 Namely the
new rules on public advertising in respect of consumer credit
contracts (now Art 3 (1) let k–n UCA) were formulated
according to the rules of the first Consumer Credit Directive
87/102/ECC. They were however, not yet adapted to the
regulations of the new Consumer Credit Directive 2008/48/
EC.45 In 1994,46 a new rule on the reversal of the burden of
proof in the field of misleading advertising (Art 13 a UCA)
was established which almost literally copied Art 6 of the
former Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertis-
ing into Swiss law.47 In 2007,48 a special rule against spam-
ming (now Art 3 (1) let o UCA) imitating Art 13 of the
Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic communica-
tions was integrated in the UCA.49
In 2012, many new special rules entered into force amongst
which the already mentioned revised Art 8 UCA was drafted
as an equivalent to Art 3 (1) Unfair Contract Terms Directive
93/13/EEC.50 Unfortunately, neither an at least indicative list
of unfair contract terms as in Annex 1 Directive 93/13/EEC51
nor a «black list» of always unfair terms and a «grey list» of
presumed unfair terms as in Art 84 and Art 85 CESL-Propo-
sal was put in place in order to clarify this rather abstract
norm.52 The lack of jurisprudence on the new Art 8 UCA
only adds to the legal uncertainty concerning the mentioned
provision.53
In 2012, the Swiss legislator adopted a new rule on pyramid
promotional schemes (Art 3 (1) let r UCA) which is very
similar to the misleading commercial practice number 14
Annex I Directive 2005/29/EC. In the course of the legislative
procedure, the draft of that provision was expressly modified
in order to adapt it to EU-law.54 The new rule on unfair
sweepstakes (Art 3 (1) let t UCA) is similar to number 31
Annex I Directive 2005/29/EC but has not expressly been
introduced according to EU-law55. The new rule on pro-
forma or fictitious invoices (Art 3 (1) let q UCA) is similar to
number 21 Annex I Directive 2005/29/EC but narrower in
scope since it concerns solely register entries and advertise-
ments.56 The new Art 3 (1) let s was inspired57 by Art 4
Distance Contracts Directive 97//EC as well as by Art 5 (1)
let c and Art 10 (1) E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC but
the Swiss norm is quite eclectic so that one cannot really
interpret it according to EU-standards.58 Finally, the new
norms on cooperation between national enforcement autho-
rities are largely influenced by the Regulation (EC) No 2006/
2004 on consumer protection cooperation from 2004.59
When Swiss legal norms are consciously drafted according to
models in EU law, one should preferably interpret them in
line with ECJ rulings and perhaps even with the decision of a
Member State’s Supreme Court.60 This concerns at least
those ECJ rulings already published when the respective
norm was drafted. Any other approach would result in dis-
respect of the Swiss legislator’s intention.
2. EU-law as persuasive authority
Taking into consideration that Swiss legal norms against
unfair competition are often vague and broad, reference to
definitions and provisions in the UCP-Directive or to ECJ
rulings can help to substantiate the Swiss norms.61 Since EU-
law is a compromise accepted by 28 Member States it has a
relatively great persuasive authority. This is particularly true
for the concrete «black list» of unfair commercial practices in
Annex I of the Directive 2005/29/EC.62 As the Swiss UCA
does not contain a definition of the term consumer, one part
of the doctrine63 refers to the definition of consumer con-
tracts established in Art 32 (2) Civil Procedure Code and
Art 120 (1) Federal Statute on Private International Law
defining consumer contracts as contracts on supplies for
ordinary consumption intended for the personal use of the
consumer or his family and offered by the other party in the
course of its professional or commercial activity. The other
part of the doctrine refers to the broader definition of Art 3
Swiss Consumer Credit Act defining the consumer as any
42 Vernehmlassungsvorlage nebst Begleitbericht für ein Bundesgesetz über
den elektronischen Geschäftsverkehr (Teilrevisionen des Obligationen-
rechts und des Bundesgesetzes gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb) vom
Januar 2001, 5 (download under ˂https://www.bj.admin.ch/dam/data/
bj/wirtschaft/gesetzgebung/archiv/e-geschaeftsverkehr/vn-ber-d.pdf˃ ac-
cessed 28 March 2016); Peter Jung (n 40 above) 525.
43 Com(77) 724 final.
44 Botschaft UWG 1009, 1021.
45 Luca Maranta and Philippe Spitz, in: Peter Jung and Philippe Spitz (eds),
Bundesgesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG) – Kommentar
(Stämpfli 2010) Art 3 let k–n para 8.
46 Bundesgesetz vom 18. Juni 1993 über die Änderung des UWG (AS
1994, 376).
47 Philippe Spitz, in: Peter Jung and Philippe Spitz (eds), Bundesgesetz
gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG) – Kommentar (Stämpfli
2010) Art 13 a paras 2 et seq.
48 Bundesgesetz vom 24. März 2006 über die Änderung des Fernmeldege-
setzes (AS 2007, 921).
49 See for the impact of EC-law Oliver Arter, ‘Lauterkeitsrechtliche As-
pekte von Werbung mittels E-Mail’ (2004) AJP 1067, 1070 et seq.
50 Botschaft zur Änderung des Bundesgesetzes gegen den unlauteren Wett-
bewerb (UWG) vom 2. September 2009, BBl 2009, 6151, 6171, 6173
and 6179.
51 See for the indicative nature of Annex I Directive 93/13/ECC ECJ at 7.5.
2002 ECLI:EU:C:2002:281, Case C-478/99 (Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities v. Kingdom of Sweden), para 22.
52 COM(2011) 635 final (since withdrawn).
53 See for several uncertainties Daphne Frei and Peter Jung (n 18 above)
165 et seq.
54 See Botschaft zur Änderung des Bundesgesetzes gegen den unlauteren
Wettbewerb (UWG) vom 2. September 2009, BBl 2009, 6151, 6169 and
6177.
55 See for the discussion in Parliament AmtlBull StR 2010, 932 et seq
(Ständerat Hermann Bürgi and Bundesrätin Doris Leuthard referring to
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natural person who is acting for purposes which are outside
his trade activity, business or profession.64 One could decide
this controversy in favour of the latter opinion arguing that it
is in line with Art 2 let a UCP-Directive.65
When evaluating the influence of a commercial practice on
the average consumer whom it reaches or to whom it is
addressed, Swiss courts tend to refer to the image of a con-
sumer being sufficiently informed, reasonably observant and
circumspect to attention in the particular situation.66 But as
provided for in the UCP-Directive, Swiss courts also consider
a special need for protection when the practice addresses
children, elderly people, foreigners or mentally restricted peo-
ple.67 In a case concerning telephone-sex, the Federal Su-
preme Court held that clients are not supposed to be able to
calculate and thus know the total price of a call if the price is
only indicated per minute.68 Moreover, the image of the
consumer as someone particularly vulnerable and defenceless
influences the new special rules on register entries and adver-
tisements, sweepstakes and pre-contractual information du-
ties in e-commerce.69
V. Conclusion
The impact of EU-law and especially of the UCP-Directive on
the Swiss law of unfair competition is relatively small. Cer-
tainly, one can find some common recent developments and
direct influences concerning consumer protection by competi-
tion law (control of unfair contract terms, advertising for
consumer credits) and new unfair practices (lack of transpar-
ency in e-commerce, pyramid promotional schemes, unfair
sweepstakes, fictitious invoices). Even in cases where EU-
norms directly inspire special rules of the Swiss UCA, they
differ in detail and at least in wording. Beyond these isolated
convergences Swiss law against unfair competition remains
independent. It maintains its peculiarities in comparison to
EU-standards like the unity of unfair competition law, the
strong functional approach, the limited significance of the
general clause, the possibility of private enforcement by the
government and the relatively great importance of criminal
sanctions. In cross-border situations one will have to be
aware of these divergences for the foreseeable future. &
64 Guido Sutter and Florian Lörtscher, ‘Klagerecht des Bundes gegen mis-
sbräuchliche AGB’ (2012) recht 93, 100.
65 See in context with Art. 8 UCA and Art 2 let b Directive 93/13/EWG
Peter Jung (n 19 above) 152.
66 BGE 132 III 414, 427 (“Taxes de pharmacie”); BGE 129 III 426, 435
(“Unclean hands”); BGer sic! 2013, 462 (“Bilderrahmen”); Carl Bau-
denbacher (supra note 13) Art 1 para 62.
67 Mario M. Pedrazzini and Federico Pedrazzini (n 36 above) para 1.73.
68 BGE 132 II 240, 249 et seq (“Nummernwiderruf”); BGE 128 IV 177,
182 (“Telefonsex”).
69 Botschaft zur Änderung des Bundesgesetzes gegen den unlauteren Wett-
bewerb (UWG) vom 2. September 2009, BBl 2009, 6151, 6174 et seq.
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Marcus Tschersich, Privacy by Default in the European
Union Proposal for Data Protection Regulation. Hamburg,
Verlag Dr. Kovač, 2015, 1-190 pages.
ISBN: 978-3830082118. € 85,80.
The book consists of five short essays that take up the challenge
of empirically studying the effects of restrictive privacy default
settings in social network sites (SNS). The studies are based on
Facebook or adopt privacy settings pioneered by Facebook.
Although the author conscientiously points out to the limitations
of all five studies and the need for future research, his contribu-
tion to the data privacy debate is especially relevant given the
controversy surrounding the provision on “privacy by default”
in the Proposal for General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR).1 The idea of “privacy by default” (PbDef), first devel-
oped by Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner Ann
Cavoukian, has been equally praised by privacy advocates for its
potential to grant more control to users of SNSs and other
electronic devices, and chastised by SNS providers and lobbyists
of technological firms that see the concept as either too excessive
or endangering the SNSs’ very business model. In a few sentences
in each of the essays, the author summarizes the main arguments
in favour of and against PbDef, as well as existing literature on
default bias. Clearly, the originality and emphasis of the studies
lay in the design of the empirical tests and the statistical analysis
of the gathered data. However, the brevity of the contextual
framework in which the author situates his work hampers both
the possibility for wider readership of the essays, e. g. one be-
yond the privacy community, and a more in-depth discussion of
his findings within the privacy community.2 In addition, the
essays lack any legal analysis of the consequences of PbDef
under EU law, in particular in relation to provisions in the
GDPR related to (express) consent and the responsibilities of
data controllers.
For the first paper, the author builds up an SNS privacy interface
prototype to investigate the influence of default settings and
interface style on the privacy configuration behavior of users. An
experiment is conducted with an overall of 632 students. The
author shows that based on the combined effect of default
settings and interface style, users having an interface with multi-
ple pages keep their default settings for the categories of Status
Updates and Media but tend to deviate from the default on
Profile Information. The author explains this tendency with the
fact that the category of Profile Information is the one that the
participants view first. Whereas the test confirms previous stu-
dies on default bias, the author convincingly argues that through
the use of a more transparent and less complex interface (in the
form of a privacy setting list instead of multiple pages scattered
throughout the platform), the majority of participants converge
in configuring their settings in sharing information with friends.
Thus, “the concerns of SNS providers regarding the functionality
of the platform are for the most parts unfounded.”3
1 Article 23.2 of the GDPR (Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with
regard to their Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data,
COM (2012) 11 final.) provides that: “the [dats] controller shall imple-
ment mechanisms for ensuring that, by default, only those personal data
are processed which are necessary for each specific purpose of the
processing and are especially not collected or retained beyond the mini-
mum necessary for those purposes, both in terms of the amount of the
data and the time of their storage. In particular, those mechanisms shall
ensure that by default personal data are not made accessible to an
indefinite number of individuals.”
2 The author avoids any normative argumentation and does not engage at
length with other academics that explore the PbDef topic. For instance,
see Lauren E. Willis, Why Not Privacy By Default, 29 Berkeley Technol-
ogy Law Journal 61 (2014).
3 M. Tschersich, “Privacy by Default in the European Union Proposal for
Data Protection Regulation”, p. 77.
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